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Group Defamation in the Netherlands
W. H. Bijleveld*
N TIS PAPER we shall discuss the ways in which Dutch law
protects against group defamation.
Criminal Law
A. Individual Defamation
Defamation of natural persons is laid down in Book II, Sec-
tion XVI, of the Penal Code. Defamation might be described as
"intentional injury of a person's honour and good name." I
The prevailing opinion is that this section (XVI) is con-
cerned only with individual natural persons. According to this
section (XVI), legal persons and groups can not be defamed.2
There are many arguments in favour of this opinion: 3
If a defamation of a collectivity were to attain an individual
character, section XVI would be applicable.4 Without this indi-
vidual character nobody would take offence. For groups, the
problem has been solved by provisions of the penal law concern-
ing group defamation, discussed below.
* Member of the Faculty of the Molengraaf Institut voor Privaatrecht of the
University of Utrecht, Netherlands.
[Note: Meaning of abbreviations:
M.v.T. (Memorie van Toelichting) = Minister's explanatory memoran-
dum on a bill.
V.V. (Voorlopig Verslag) = Interim report; viz. comment by Chamber-
committee.
M.v-A. (Memorie van Antwoord = Minister's memorandum reply to
interim report, after discussion of a bill in the Second and First
Chambers.
N.J. (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie) = Publication of Dutch court de-
cisions.
W. (Weekblad) = A Dutch law review, last published in 1936.
The Editors regretfully were obliged to shorten this article (much longer in
manuscript) because of space limitations.]
1 van Bemmelen-van Hattum: Hand- en leerboek van het Nederlandse
Strafrecht, Deel II-Bijzondere delicten. P. 488.
2 Noyon-Langemeyer, Het Wetboek van Strafrecbt verklaard-vol. II, p. 248.
Also Supreme Court 16-2-1891 W.6083.
3 Noyon-Langemeyer II, pp. 248 and 249.
4 M.v.T. on Section XVI of the Penal Law. In the same way: Supreme
Court 31-10-1892 W.6261, where somebody was sentenced on account of
individual defamation because he had expressed his opinion on the whole
police force of the town in highly defamatory language to a policeman of
that force.
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We concur with van Bemmelen, who holds the view that
legal persons can be defamed. The author mentioned thinks,
however, that the present text of the law in section XVI does not
cover the case, and should be altered.5 We differ. We do not
agree with the prevailing opinion that section XVI is useless as
to corporate or other groups.
Defamation of public authority, public corporations, and
public institutions is possible, though the last mentioned are often
incorporated. According to article 137a and 137b of the penal
code these collectivities can be offended. These provisions, intro-
duced in 1934 together with articles 137c and 137d, concerning
the defamation of groups of persons, need no further discussion
as they read the same as articles 137c and 137d, discussed below.
City councils, police forces, the cabinet council, or a munici-
pal waterworks, come under public authority, public corpora-
tions, and public institutions.
Three classes of defamation exist:
a. "Smaad" = Libel
This is injuring a person's honour or good name by charging
him with certain facts with the intention to make it known.
b. "Laster" = defamation contrary to truth
If, for his defense, the defendant appeals to the public inter-
est, the judge may demand proof of the truth of defendant's opin-
ion. Should the defendant fail to give this proof, then conviction
because of "laster" is possible.
c. Simple defamation
This is intentional defamation not having the character of
"smaad" or "laster," i.e., a defamation lacking either the charging
of a certain fact, or the making it known.
In practice the defamation will be an utterance in wilful
defamatory form, e.g., the use of abusive terms, slapping a per-
son's face, etc.
Only simple defamation needs further discussion, since, as
we shall see, in group defamation only the defamatory form is
made punishable.
"Injury of a person's honour or good name." Honour or good
name need not actually be harmed. The point is whether the re-
mark is of a character such that, in general, injury can be ex-
pected.




The form in which the remark has been made must be of an
offensive character. In most cases the meaning of the remark
itself will decide whether it is defamatory or not. However,
account should be taken of the milieu.
The remark may consist of spoken words, a document, a
picture, or acts of violence.0 For instance, a picture may consist
of a caricature; acts of violence may consist of spitting at a per-
son's face, or a blow in the face.
7
The intent consists of the "Animus Iniuriandi." It is irrele-
vant whether the defamation came home. The intent will often
arise from the remark itself.
Defamation is a delict on complaint; so, without permission
of the offended person the public prosecutor shall not proceed to
prosecution. Complaint is prerequisite for prosecution.7a
An appeal to the public interest, or to necessary defense, to
preclude punishability, is not possible. In case of "smaad" or
"laster" an appeal may well be possible, because from the society
point of view it is sometimes useful to make certain facts public.
We need only think of the press.
B. Group Defamation
Prior to 1934 Dutch law contained no penal provision against
group defamation.8 With the rise of national socialism it appeared
necessary to protect against group defamation in criminal law.
The Government was of opinion that the circumstances made
it imperative to revise the penal law with regard to public pol-
icy,9 since repeatedly remarks were made in public which were
injurious and insulting to certain groups of the population.
Among other things the Government recalled recent expressions
concerning Jewish fellow citizens. 10 There also were defamations
of other groups of the population. 1
During the discussion of the proposed draft of a new law on
the subject of group defamation in the second, and first chambers,
heated debates took place.
6 Art. 226, Penal Code.
7 A blow in the face will be considered rather as criminal maltreatment.
7a W.P.J. Pompe, Handboek van bet Nederlandse Strafrecht, p. 533.
8 Under article 2 of the Act of May 16, 1829 a form of group defamation
existed. However, with the introduction of the new Penal Code it was
abolished in 1886.
9 M.v.T., Wetgevingsbijlage Nederlands Juristenblad XCIII p. 4.
10 M.v.T. p. 7.
11 M.v.T. p. 7.
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The upholders referred to article 4 of the Constitution: "All
those who are within the territory of the state are equally en-
titled to protection of person and goods." It is the honour and
good name that are the integral part of the personality.' 2
Opponents of the (new) provisions appealed to article 7 of
the Constitution: "Nobody needs previous permission to publish
thoughts and feelings through the press, barring responsibility
according to the law." The principle of freedom of the press ex-
pressed in this article was considered to be impugned by intro-
duction of the provisions. 13
This is an extremely weak argument. Freedom of the press
is too often regarded as an absolute right, thereby ignoring the
text of the Constitution. For, according to the law, one is always
responsible. The bill proposed made no mention of preventive
censure.
The Government's reply to this objection carried conviction,
and holds also for the entire problem of freedom of speech,
against the infringement of which difficulties were raised. 14
Criticism remains possible whether it is true or not. How-
ever, there should never be any reason to do this in defamatory
form.1 5
Should the remark "communists are dirty traitors" entail
criminal proceedings?' 6 Public opinion would not accept this.
Another objection against the proposed Bill was that a gen-
eral penal provision was aimed to protect only a special group
of the population in a special period, namely the Jews.' T
Actually the Government had declared that the proposed
provisions would also apply to defamation of other groups, e.g.,
clergymen, the Roman Catholic clergy,' 8 the communists, and
the freemasons. 19
In addition, throughout Europe symptoms of group defama-
tion were observed, which were certainly not directed against
12 M.v.T. p. 7.
13 V.V. (Interim Report) pp. 48 and 49.
14 V.V. First Chamber p. 49.
15 M.v.A. First Chamber p. 55. M.v.A. Second Chamber p. 27. Contra: van
Bemmelen p. 111.
16 It should be noted here that the communist party is not forbidden in the
Netherlands, so that the communists cannot be denied the predicate "popu-
lation group."
17 V.V. Second Chamber p. 11. V.V. First Chamber p. 19.
18 M.v.T. p. 7.




the Jews alone. These insults occurred especially in the religious
field, e.g., against the Roman Catholics, and ministers of religion.
The main argument of the government to proceed to the
introduction of the articles 137c and 137d was to maintain public
order.
Group defamation endangers the nation's feeling of solidar-
ity.20 Indeed it is a direct threat to public order.
To those who doubt whether it is just anti-semitism that will
endanger public order, that reports concerning it were exagger-
ated,21 and that after all society will cure itself,22 one may reply
that maintenance of public order is not only a national problem
but also an international one. Because of increasing economic
and mental contacts political movements easily spread from one
country to another. 23 That public order would be threatened by
defamation of the Jewish part of the nation is obvious.
In 1934 articles 137c and 137d, already mentioned, after the
passing of the bill in question, were inserted in the Penal Code.
At the same time the articles 137a and 137b (not discussed here)
were introduced, with a view to protect against defamation of
public authority, public corporations and public institutions. Also
in the latter articles only the defamatory form was made punish-
able.
Articles 137c and 137d largely aimed at maintenance of
public order. Only in second place came the protection of the
persons defamed. 24 For this reason they were not inserted in
Book II section XVI concerning defamation, but in book II sec-
tion V dealing with offences against public order.
From this we first and foremost understand that prosecution
of group defamation requires no complaint.
Art. 137c: He, who in public gives his opinion orally, in
writing or picture in a defamatory form about a group of the
population or a group of persons partly belonging to the pop-
ulation shall be punished with imprisonment of at most one
year or a fine of at most six hundred guilders.
The words "in defamatory form" mean first of all that if the
opinion was directed at an individual person there would be
20 M.v.T. p. 7.
21 V.V. Second Chamber p. 11.
22 V.V. First Chamber p. 46.
23 M.vA. Second Chamber p. 19.
24 M.v.A. Second Chamber p. 59.
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question of a personal individual offence according to section
XVI, namely of simple defamation.
25
The argument "that to make the defamatory form punishable
is not correct because everybody speaks according to character
and that the principal thing is what has been said and not how" 26
does not hold.
2 7
The judge decides by considering the milieu in which it took
place.28
For the offence of group defamation the same intent is re-
quired as for individual defamation, hence the animus iniuriandi.
It is not necessary that the group is actually injured in their hon-
our and good name, it is sufficient that the form is really offen-
sive. The intent can often be proved from the meaning of the
expression itself.
29
To be able to speak of a "group of the population" two re-
quirements are called for:
1. The offensive expression must refer to several persons of
our population.
2. In this expression these persons should be indicated col-
lectively. This indication may refer to an objectively ex-
isting common characteristic or to a common quality or
function, but it may also be based on a subjective sum-
ming up coming from the person who expresses himself
offensively. 3
0
Defamation of one group can more readily be established
than that of another. To make distinction, however, by naming
the (various) groups of the population that can be defamed or
not, the Minister considered to be impossible.3 1
In order to know who should be included in the concept of
"group of the population" one may refer to article 83 bis of the
Penal Code, which, with a view to the introduction of articles
137c and 137d, was inserted at the same time. It defines that by
"population" one shall understand all those within the territory
25 M.v.A. Second Chamber p. 19.
26 M.v A.. Second Chamber p. 26.
27 Van Bemmelen p. 111.
28 Report of Verbal deliberation pp. 41 and 43.
29 District Court at the Hague 21-2-1936 N.J. 1936 No. 180.
30 M.v-A. First Chamber p. 53.




of the State in Europe.3 2 "All" means: also those who at the
time the offensive expression occurred happen to be within the
territory of the State. On this point article 4 of the Constitution
states that everybody within the territory of the State is equally
entitled to protection of person and goods.33 This is the right
view, for besides the maintenance of the public order art. 137c
and 137d also aim at protecting honour and good name.3
4
As an example, action for defamation of Dutch colonists in
the former Dutch East Indies was accepted, because, usually,
some of them would be staying in the Netherlands.3
5
The concept "a group of persons partly belonging to the
population" had to be included in article 137c because there are
many groups of an international character which as groups live
but partly in our country.3 6 For instance, the Jews, the Roman
Catholics, and the Freemasons.
He who does not himself commit the group defamation but
takes care that the defamation is disseminated is guilty of the
offence of dissemination under article 137d.
Art. 137d: A person who disseminates, exhibits publicly,
makes audible in public, or has in stock for that purpose, a
writing or picture that contains a defamatory expression of
a group of the population shall be punished with imprison-
ment of at most 6 months or a fine of at most 600 guilders
if the disseminator knew, or had serious reason to presume
that the writing or picture contained such an expression.
The most important part of this provision is that intent is
not required. It is sufficient that the offender was aware, or had
serious reasons to presume, that the writing he disseminated
contained a communication in defamatory form of a group of the
population.
In case of such knowledge the disseminator may be reason-
ably expected to have satisfied himself of the character of the
writings.37 Van Bemmelen is of opinion that booksellers and sell-
ers of newspapers and journals are obliged to exercise a kind
32 At that time the former-Dutch East Indies formed part of the State; at
present only Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles.
33 M.v.T. p. 7.
34 M.v.A. Second Chamber p. 29.
35 Supreme Court 17-4-1939 NJ. 1939 No. 927.
36 M.v.A. Second Chamber p. 25.
37 M.vA. Second Chamber p. 25.
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of censure themselves. Freedom of the press would thereby be
endangered. 8
In our opinion there is no such danger, provided that the
word "serious" is indeed seriously taken by the judge. The judge
in the Netherlands is appointed for life and is completely inde-
pendent, and is not apt to fail in his inquiry.
He who distributes more than one copy of a writing or pic-
ture must be considered to be the disseminator. It does not imply
(a much broader concept) the person who makes public the idea-
content of a writing or picture.
For instance, he who cites or discusses defamatory expres-
sions in a journal or newspaper is not a disseminator in the sense
of our Penal Code3 9 unless he does so only to make the defama-
tion known.
Between 1936 and 1940 the courts applied articles 137c and
137d in six cases. After the 2nd World War, insofar as we could
trace it, no prosecution concerned with group defamation oc-
curred. The cases were:
I. District Court at the Hague 21-2-1936 N.J. 1936 no. 180.
In N.S.B.-paper (Fascist) a defamatory article on the Jews.
The writer of the article was prosecuted according to article
137c.
The court considered:
a. The form of the statement was extremely defamatory.
b. The intent to defame, by wilfully writing down the de-
famatory words and making them public, was implicit
absolutely.
c. Appeal to personal conviction should never be an excuse
for committing a criminal offence.
d. In connection with the age of the defendant (74 years)
no imprisonment, but a maximal fine of 300 guilders.
40
II. District Court Rotterdam 16-7-1937 N.J. 1938 no. 736.
A writing in which the New Malthusian Society was accused
of "publicly inciting to murder of unborn creatures." De-
fendant was prosecuted for distributing this writing accord-
ing to article 137d.
The court considered:
a. It is a statement in defamatory form.
38 Van Bemmelen p. 104.
39 M.v.A. First Chamber p. 53.





b. The members of the New Malthusian Society in fairly
great numbers hold principles that are well known and
thus form a community.
c. No punishment was reported at the place of reference.
III. Supreme Court 17-4-1939 N.J. 1939 no. 927.
Book on the planter's life in the Indies. In it defamatory ex-
pressions about the planters (Dutchmen who, as colonists,
exploited plantations in the former Dutch East Indies).
The author was prosecuted according to art. 137d.
The court held:
a. Adverse opinion on the planter's life in the Dutch East
Indies is given in a needlessly defamatory form.
b. Irrelevant whether the planter's life, as pictured, corre-
sponds to reality.
c. Sentence: One month conditional imprisonment with a
probationary of three years41 and a fine of fl. 300. - with
the alternative of 100 days imprisonment.
IV. Supreme Court 19-2-1940 N.J. 1940 no. 754.
The N.S.B.-paper "Volk en Vaderland" (National Socialist)
contained an article having the following passage: "Inter-
national Jewry, which as the eternal parasite on labour,
knows how to play their part under all circumstances, also
in times of permanent unemployment and slump."
The editor, who denied writing the article, was prose-
cuted in accordance with article 137c.
The court held:
a. The passage cited does not consist of allowable pertinent
remarks, but, considering the highly unfavourable mean-
ing of "parasite," this passage contains a needlessly de-
basing qualification and hence a communication in de-
famatory form ex article 137c.
b. The term "International Jewry" can have no other mean-
ing than that it includes all other Jews living in different
countries. Consequently it is a community one is dealing
with, and not a mental attitude, as is claimed by the de-
fendant.
c. "To communicate by writing" is to express one's own
thoughts or feelings. The editor did not disclaim these
communications, for he failed to leave them to the re-
sponsibility of the writer.
41 That is, the sentence is not executed except when the condemned person
is again guilty of a criminal offence during the probationary period, or mis-
behaves in some other way, or does not abide by the conditions made in the
sentence.
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d. Sentence: fine of fl. 25.-, with the alternative of 25 days
imprisonment.
V. Supreme Court 4-3-1940. N.J. 1940 no. 830.
Pamphlet of a defamatory nature against ministers of reli-
gion. Defendants are prosecuted according to article 137d
because of distributing the pamphlets and having these in
stock.
The court held:
a. The actual defamatory form.
b. The defendants' defence that they felt called upon by re-
ligious conviction to profess the truth, does not hold. The
conviction may justify fighting against the ministers of
religion, but this should not be done in defamatory form.
c. Sentence: 14 days conditional imprisonment with a pro-
bationary period of two years.
VI. Supreme Court 29-4-1940 N.J. 1940 no. 831.
Defendant had in stock to distribute copies in writing that
were defamatory of the Roman Catholic clergy.
The latter were characterized as a "godless class" and
"the most ungodly and blasphemous of all those who occupy
the earth." He was prosecuted according to article 137d.
The court found:
a. Actual defamatory form.
b. Since the defendant had read the leaflets he "knew" the
defamatory form.
c. Sentence: fine of fl. 50.- with the alternative of 25 days
imprisonment.
The Administrative Aspect
We now discuss the power of public authorities to protect
against group defamation without judgement of a court. In other
words, the question should be raised, how far public authority
may restrict freedom of expression and, consequently, group
defamation.
This question is first controlled by article 10 of the Conven-
tion of Rome for the protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, contracted in 1950 by the countries affiliated to the
West-European Union.
Art. 10-1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to re-
ceive and impart information and ideas without interference




This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.
-2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with
it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formal-
ities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the in-
terests of national security, territorial integrity or public
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the pro-
tection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputa-
tion or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the
authority and impartiality of the judiciary.
We will consider the Dutch legal provisions concerning these
matters.
Radio Broadcasts
I. Legal Provisions Before the 2nd World War
Article 3 of the Telegraph and Telephone Act of 1904. In
this article the government had power to make provision con-
cerning license for broadcasting, the contents of the broadcast,
control and possibility of interference with a broadcast, author-
izing the government to enforce a penal sanction of a maximal
imprisonment of six months or a fine of one thousand guilders.
In 1930 the government made use of the power and issued
two orders in Council, the so-called radio rule, and the radio
control rule. On these two rules the whole judicial system of
broadcasting has been built up. Broadcasting requires a license.'
No license is granted when the interests of national security,
public safety or public morality are endangered.2 The contents
of a broadcast should not endanger the security of the state,
public safety or public morals. 3 It should not lead to the under-
mining of religion, morality, public authority and the nation's
health, nor should the broadcast apparently be intended for for-
eign countries, if it is known that a friendly nation would not
admit it. Information of a political character shall contain only
objective exposition of political principles. 4
It is clear that these rules far exceed the articles concerned
with the criminal defamation. For instance the undermining
I Art. 2 paragraph 1 Radio Rule.
2 Art. 2 paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the Radio Rule.
3 Art. 9 Radio Rule.
4 Art. 2 paragraph 2 Radio Rule.
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1964
13 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (1)
mentioned may certainly occur without actual expression in de-
famatory form. Accordingly "laster" of a community, though
stated in decent terms, can be prevented.
There is a preventive control which is exercised by the
broadcasting control committee.5 This control implies that the
broadcasting companies shall timely submit their programs to the
control committee for approval.6 This committee may even de-
mand the text and ask for all information they think necessary.6
In case the control committee forbids a certain broadcast,
the broadcasting corporation concerned may appeal to the min-
ister. The latter may suspend or reverse the committee's deci-
sion because it is in defiance of the law or against the public
interest.
7
Breaking off the broadcast is possible if a broadcasting organ-
isation is broadcasting a program that is different from the one
given permission for. This is the exclusive reason for breaking
off a broadcast."
In the cases when reprehensible broadcast escaped the atten-
tion of the control committee, or when the program differs from
the one that was given permission for, there is naturally also
repressive control.
Repressive control consists of listening to the programs and,
if necessary, tape recording them by officials added to the control
committee for this purpose.9
The sanctions that may be applied are:
a. Withdrawing the license.'0
b. Prohibition to broadcast during a certain period."
c. Penal sanction of a maximal imprisonment of six months
or a fine of maximal fl. 1000.12
II. Present Legal Provision
Dominated by article 10 of the Roman Convention, in 1944
the Dutch government in London promulgated a decree in which
5 Art. 1 Radio-Control-Rule.
6 Art. 7 paragraph 1 Art. 12 Radio-Control-Rule.
7 Art. 13 Radio-Control-Rule.
8 Art. 8 Radio Control Rule.
9 Art. 9 and Art. 2 Radio Control Rule.
10 Art. 3 Radio Rule.
11 Art. 11 Radio Control Rule.




the radio rule and consequently also the radio control rule were
declared, with some irrelevant exceptions, to be no longer appli-
cable. All licenses so far granted were withdrawn. 13
With a decree of 1946 the Minister of public instruction, arts
and science was ultimately given the legislative power to make
a provision in view of article 3 of the Telegraph and Telephone
Act.' 4 This he did with the ministerial ordinance-air-time dis-
tribution of January 15, 1947. The present provision is based on
the ordinance-air-time distribution and on a royal decree of 1954,
stating that article 2 paragraph 1 of the radio rule is again appli-
cable, so that just as before the war, a license is required for
broadcasting under the Royal Decree of 1954 just mentioned.
Control is exercised in the name of the minister of public
instruction, arts and science by the government's representative
for the broadcasting organisation. 5 The government no longer
exercises preventive control; however, it was agreed upon be-
tween the government and the broadcasting corporations that the
latter would themselves exercise an internal, preventive control.
Preventive control by the minister will always be possible
in virtue of an ordinance to be promulgated by him.
The sanctions are:
a. Temporary or permanent withdrawal of the broadcasting
license.16
b. The Government's representative can forbid certain peo-
ple to cooperate in programs for a certain period, if they
have given cause.17
c. Withdrawal or suspension of the wireless moneys the
broadcasting companies are entitled to under this ordi-
nance.
Television
Just as with the radio the minister of public instruction, arts
and sciences has general management with respect to television.
After the minister had issued a T.V.-ordinance for a provision of
the T.V. at its experimental stage in 1951, the crown came a few
13 Royal Decree of 17 Sept. 1944 Stb.E.118.
14 Royal Decree of July 2, 1946 Stb.G.167.
15 Air-time distribution Art. 2.
16 Air-time distribution Art. 22.
17 Air-time distribution Art. 17.
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years later with an order in Council, the so-called T.V. decree,
which represents the present provision.
Television broadcasting requires a license Is granted by the
Minister of practical instruction, arts and science.
Contents of the programs shall contain nothing that endan-
gers the national security, public order or public morals. This
requirement is stated in article 4 T.V.-decree and results also
from article 3 of the T.- and T. Act.
Supervision and control are exercised in the name of the
minister by the government's representative for the broadcasting
organisation. The control is repressive.19 This means only that
demanding beforehand perusal of the programs and verbal text,
are precluded. Other preventive measures remain possible, how-
ever, the minister has further the power to break off the pro-
grams partly or completely if he considers it necessary in the
public interest.
The repressive measures are: 20
a. Withdrawal of the television license;
b. The prohibition to broadcast during a certain period;
c. Prohibition of certain people in the program for a certain
period, if they transgressed provisions of the T.V.-decree.
We now have to apply the points discussed to group defama-
tion. Starting from article 10 of the Rome Convention we see
that legal restriction of the freedom of expression is also admis-
sible for the protection of the good name of others. Curbing the
freedom of expression is therefore certainly permitted for the
protection of the good name of communities.
Dutch law has inserted the restriction of group defamation
in article 3 of the T.- and T. Act. This signifies that whenever
injury of the good name of communities leads to the endangering
of the national security, of public order or of public morals, the
government may act under the valid provision of radio-and T.V.
organisation.
One has to appeal to article 3 of the T. and T. Act, because
an appeal to the Ordinance-air-time-distribution and the T.V.-
decree is not directly possible. These-two provisions ar.enot-law,
but a ministerial ordinance and a Royal decree respectively,
while article 10 of the Convention of Rome prescribes criteria
18 T.V.-decree Art. 17.
19 T.V.-decree Art. 6.




mentioned in an Act. In practice there is no difference between
on the one hand the ordinance and the decree and on the other
the Telegraph and Telephone Act, since they all make use of the
same criteria, public order and public morals.
21
The importance of the government's powers, in this case
those of the Minister of public instruction, arts and science, is
quite clear.
He is permitted to refuse broadcasting licenses to organisa-
tions which previously had been guilty of injuring the good name
of communities, whether in defamatory form or not. With the
pre-war preventive control it was possible to forbid broadcasts
that contained group defamation. In such a case the broadcasts
could also be suspended. Should group defamation actually occur
during broadcasting, then the repressive measures discussed
above are possible; before the war there was also the penal sanc-
tion. All of them are sufficient to compel the broadcasting corpo-
rations to proceed with caution.
Of course the penal sanctions of articles 137c and 137d re-
main in force also for group defamation in radio and T.V. beside
the measures to be taken by the government, also the judge can
pronounce a sentence.
1. In 1938 the lecture "New modernistic tendencies in
the Roman Catholic Church" was forbidden, because this
lecture contained a continuous aggression against the Roman
Catholic Church, because of the extremely one-sided way in
which the modernism was dealt with. According to the con-
trol committee, broadcasting it would have endangered pub-
lic order.
22
2. In 1939 the radio play "The Command" was forbid-
den. In this play the sacrificing of 10,000 soldiers was treat-
ed so as to arouse an unjustifiable reaction in the listeners
against the army in general. Broadcasting it would have
been in defiance of the public order.
23
3. In 1937 the discourse "The Righteous Judge" was for-
bidden because it pictured the double-faced morality of a
judge who acted in his private life quite differently from
what he considered to be right for his office. The control
committee saw in it a veiled injury of confidence in the judi-
ciary. To broadcast it would have been in defiance of the
legal prescriptions.
2 4
21 W.F.Prins, in Nederlands Juristenblad (1963) p. 248.
22 Annual report of the Radio Control Committee (1938) p. 62.
23 Annual report of the Radio Control Committee (1937) p. 56.
24 Annual report of the Radio Control Committee (1937) p. 59.
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4. In 1936 there was the question of a lecture titled:
"The Apostolate among the Jews." The lecture was not for-
bidden, but the control committee suggested to the broad-
casting corporation not to broadcast it. The main objection
of the committee was that, apart from the possibility that
orthodox Jews would be insulted in their profoundest con-
viction by listening to it, the exceptional character of this
mission work (evangelization) not only entails a prudent
but also a highly individual way of proceeding. The com-
mittee considered general propagating by radio-broadcast not
suitable.
25
Since the war, pre-war preventive control has been aban-
doned.
Public Film-Shows
Again article 10 of the Rome Convention is the starting point.
Dutch law may decide on the license to show films, the control
and the sanctions to be applied in case of transgression.
The Dutch legal provision is laid down in the Cinema Law
of 1936.
A license is granted by the municipality.' It is refused when
there is a risk that the applicant will not observe the provisions
of the Cinema Act.
2
Films are censored beforehand by the Central Committee for
the Censorship of Films residing at the Hague. The criterion is
that film shows should not be in conffict with public morals or
public order.3
The Central Committee is permitted to make cuts4 and may
even forbid the public showing. 5 It also establishes the age-limit
at which the film is open to the public. Films may be admissible
to all age-limits, to older than 14 years, or to older than 18 years.5
The criterion for this age-limit is admissibility, a concept not
found in the Dutch law and so to be determined by the Central
Committee itself. The criterion for persons older than 18 years
is the danger to public morals or public order.
When the Central Committee bans a film, re-examination is
25 Annual Report Radio Control Committee (1936) p. 46.
I Art. 1 Cinema Act.
2 Art. 3 Cinema Act.
s Art. 16, Art. 15 Cinema Act.
4 Art. 23 paragraph 6 Cinema decree.




permitted by the Cinema Decree,6 no further appeal whatever is
possible.
A question is whether the civil court can forbid a film show,
partly or completely, once the central committee has admitted
the film. This power the civil court really has, but only when the
film would be a tort against one or more persons.7 It shall not
decide on whether the show would be a violation of public order
or public morals, for then it would enter the domain where only
the Central Committee is authorized to act.
In the opinion of the Central Committee the film "Guys and
Dolls" was defamatory of the Salvation Army, because of the de-
piction of a drunk salvationist, a woman who also visited a night
club and there, from the salvationist's point of view assumed
somewhat "funny" airs. After some cuts the film was ultimately
admitted. "Tyl Uylenspiegel" was also prohibited and admitted
only after some cuts, because the Roman Catholics might feel
defamed by an incorrect presentation of letters of indulgence.
"Mother Johanna of the Angels" was a similar case, but it was
finally admitted after re-examination. In this film some nuns
were shown, possessed by the devil, indulging in excessive be-
haviour in conflict with their status. Many Biblical films met
with severe criticism from certain quarters. They were generally
admitted, except one, "The Sign of the Cross," which was con-
sidered to be defamatory of the Christian community on account
of the depiction of Maria Magdalena. After cuts the film was
admitted.
Theatrical Performances
Administration concerning theatrical performances is placed
in the hands of the mayor of the municipality under the Munici-
pality Act of 1855.
No license is required for giving theatrical performances.
The criterion is that the performances shall not endanger the
public order or public morals.
The powers of the mayor are derived from article 221 Mu-
nicipality Act. This article prescribes that he "police" the the-
atres and that he must guard against performances that are in
conflict with public order or public morality.
6 Art. 28 Cinema decree.
7 President of Court of Rotterdam 24-10-1932 N.J. 1932 p. 1602.
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He can exercise preventive control by previously demanding
the texts of the plays and so verify whether they are not con-
trary to public order or public morals. In such a case he can
forbid the performance.
When performances in a theatre have been given that were
in conflict with the legal criteria, he may take repressive meas-
ures which will consist of prohibiting the performance of plays in
that theatre for a certain period, if he is of opinion that by doing
so he will prevent the risk of endangering public order or public
morals.
He can also break off the performances by having the house
cleared, if necessary by means of the strong arm. Against the
mayor's decision there is no appeal.
Powers of the Mayor in General
The mayor is authorized to take all measures to oppose ac-
tual disturbance (of the peace).' In this case he may even call
in the military force.2 For the measures he takes, he is liable to
no authority whatever, just as with the theatrical performances.
While the mayor can interfere with theatrical performances
in case of conflict with public order (used in a broad sense) and
public morals, in other spheres he has this power only in case of
danger to public order (used in a narrow sense), hence when
there is danger to actual disturbance.
These powers can be of importance in group defamation. He
may forbid demonstrations against groups and have these broken
up by the police. He may prevent the dissemination of group
defamatory writings by seizing them.
Group Defamation in Civil Law.
In the Netherlands group defamation in civil law is hardly
of interest. As far as we know code decisions never mention it,
and the literature disposes of it in one single sentence.
Beside Article 1401 of the Civil Code, which gives a general
action of tort, the Civil Code also knows a special action of
defamation. The latter is prescribed in Articles 1408-1416 Civil
Code.
The action of defamation is possible only when the expres-
sion is defamatory according to criminal law. See Supreme Court
1 Art. 219 Municipality Act.




10-1-1896 W 6761, when an appeal was made to the history of the
law and to the text of article 1408 and following articles, which
had been brought into agreement with article 261 and following
of the criminal law.
The Civil-Defamation-Action Is Threefold:
I. Damages for pecuniary loss.
II. Compensation for injured feelings.
III. Statement in the sentence that the expression is de-
famatory, with the possible demand that the sentence be
posted in public.
The Code decisions are divided on the question whether a
legal person can be defamed under articles 1408-1416 Civil Code."
The literature answers the question largely in the affirmative.
2
In our opinion a legal person cannot act under articles 1408-1416
Civil Code.
There are two kinds of interest in this question. First, dam-
ages for injured feelings are not possible in a general-action-of-
tort, ex 1401 Civil Code, but in defamation-action it is. Secondly,
the defamation-action has a period of limitation of one year, the
general-action-of-tort a period of limitation of thirty years. This
is very important because the Supreme Court has decided that,
after a lapse of one year, the defamation-action cannot again be
based on the general action of 1401 Civil Code. 3
Articles 1408-1416, in our opinion, have not been written for
defamation of legal persons, for a legal person cannot be com-
pensated for injured feelings. Neither can a group of the popu-
lation be defamed under articles 1408-1416.
The General-Action-of-Tort of 1401 Civil Code
In civil law defamation of legal persons and communities can
lead only to a general action of tort ex article 1401 Civil Code.
A defamation-action as such is no longer considered.
1 pro: Distr. Court at Rotterdam 2-11-1937 NJ. '38, 451.
" Court of Appeal at 's-Hertogenbosch 30-6-1953, N.J. '53, p. 759.
contra: Distr. Court in Amsterdam 5-1-1925 NJ. '25, 403.
Court at Dordrecht 8-12-1926 NJ. '27, 1008.
Court of Appeal at The Hague 31-10-1940 N.J. '41, 100.
2 Asser-Rutten, Verbintenissenrecht I, p. 572; Hofman-Drion-Wiersma, Het
Nederlandse Verbintenissenrecht II, p. 286; Wolfbergen bl. 184; Meyers in:
Opstellen over Hedendaagsrecht, p. 181.
8 Supreme Court, 10-4-1959 N.J. '60, 114.
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Article 1401 Civil Code: Every tort inflicting damage to an-
other person will make the person causing the damage respon-
sible for compensation.
According to the Supreme Court 4 an act constitutes a tort
if it:
a. It violates the subjective right of another, or
b. Is contrary to the legal duty of the offender, or
c. Runs counter to public morals, or
d. Contravenes the care that behooves one in social inter-
course with respect to the other person or person's prop-
erty.
The right to honour and a good name is a subjective right.5
It can be violated without making use of an offensive form. Also
public morals and the proper carefulness cover many such re-
marks.
For the general action of article 1401 it is not important
whether the remark was aimed at an individual person or at a
community as a whole. The only relevant point is if an individual
person has suffered damage by the remark used.
The difficulty with the defamation action (who is to act as
plaintiff in the process) is absent here. Every individual person
who has suffered damage by the remark may bring an action,
whether he is defamed directly or not. Intent is not required,
the guilt may also consist of negligence (inadvertence).
The essential requirement is that there shall be a causal re-
lationship between the act and the damage.
Here the Supreme Court applies the adequacy-theory, ac-
cording to which the offender is responsible for the damage, only
when it can be reasonably expected to be the result of his tort.6
This limitation of liability does not hold for the amount of
damage. Then predictability is not required. For instance, when
a stone is thrown into a dilapidated house, and thereby a costly
Rembrandt is destroyed, one is liable for the whole damage, even
though one could not expect a so costly painting to hang in a
house like that.
In the case of group defamation it is a difficult question when
to speak of a reasonably expected result. Is it reasonable to ex-
4 Supreme Court 31-1-1919 N.J. '19, 161.
5 Asser-Rutten II pp. 449-450.




pect that the windows of a Negro shopkeeper will be smashed in
an anti-Negro campaign?
The difficulty is that, in contrast with many other forms of
tort, here intermediate actions of other people are needed to have
damage follow. With the incautious handling of a rifle the case is
different, for no actions of others are involved.
With an action as meant in 1401 Civil Code only damages
for pecuniary loss can be demanded. Compensation for injured
feelings is not possible.7
This is the great difference from the defamation action, for
in that case smart-money is possible. Pecuniary loss may, for
example, consist of a drastic decrease in the turnover of a Jew-
ish shopkeeper's trade, caused by injury of honour and good
name of the Jewish community in general.
Besides damages for pecuniary loss under article 1401 Civil
Code one may also demand:
I. Restitution to the Previous Condition.
Thus, a member of a defamed community may demand that
posters which injure the honour and good name of the commu-
nity be removed by the offender. In this case he will have to
prove that he suffered pecuniary loss or will suffer by these
posters in future.
II. The Statement That the Act Constitutes a Tort.
This may occur when a newspaper has published an article
which is defamatory of a certain group. In this paper it will have
to be stated clearly and visibly that the publication of this article
was a tort.
III. Prohibition to Commit a Certain Act.
The plaintiff may demand that certain acts shall not take
place in future, because they may lead to a tort.
For instance, the plaintiff may demand that a meeting, of
which may be expected that it will be of an anti-papist or anti-
semitic character, shall not take place. Of course he will have to
prove that if the meeting is held he will suffer damage.
An act loses its character of a tort on grounds of justification.
The grounds are first of all "force majeur," stress of necessity,
executing a legal prescription, and complying with official corn-
7 Supreme Court 14-11-1958 NJ. '59, 15.
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mand.8 However, these grounds are apt not to occur in group
defamation. Besides, there is also an appeal to public interest.
This interest may bring with it that, as a warning to the public
the private interest of certain persons will be sacrificed, for in-
stance by mentioning of their names.9 The requirement is that
the remark shall be concerned with a cause which, according to
general opinion, is considered to be a public interest.10 There is
further the tendency to grant the press rather than an individual
person an appeal to public interest, because the latter's own in-
terest may be involved."
Conclusion: As we have already remarked, the civil law
aspect of group defamation is of little interest. On the one side
this is mainly due to the fact that group defamation is of little
significance in Dutch society, on the other because the causal
relationship as well as the damage will be difficult to prove.
There is not reason to assume that in future much will appear
in this respect.
8 Asser-Rutten II p. 459.
9 Court of Appeal in Amsterdam 25-2-1960 N.J. '60, 502.
10 Court of Appeal in Amsterdam 24-10-1935 N.J. '35, 1623.
11 District Court Groningen 5-8-1956 N.J. '56, 506.
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